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The Continuing Development of United
States Policy Concerning the International
Movement of Cultural Property
I. Introduction
Since the early 1970's the international legal community has
become increasingly aware of the illicit traffic in cultural properties.'
Although this problem traces back to the days of Greece and Rome,
only recently has it become questioned.' Generally, the policy among
art collectors and museums was to acquire whatever was available
without any question as to the particular provenance of the work.3
Through the efforts of dedicated archaeologists and art historians,4
however, the problem has been brought to the attention of the world
legal community. This movement reached its current plateau with
the implementation by the United States of the 1970 UNESCO
Convention on Cultural Property."
In the United States, implementation of the Convention did not
come easily; numerous bills were introduced between the Senate's
original approval in 19726 and final implementation in 1983.7 Even
with the signing of this legislation, the controversy has not ended.
Questions still persist concerning enforcement, repose of objects al-
ready in American collections, and claims made by interested parties
regarding the need for additional legislation.'
The ongoing legislative efforts concerning the international
movement of cultural property reflects the fact that this is an area of
I. In this comment the term "cultural property" is used to mean any works of art,
archaeological finds, handicrafts, ideas, land and fixtures, manufactured goods of pre-industrial
societies, and paleontological remains. See generally, P. BATOR, THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE
IN ART (1983) [originally published as An Essay on the International Trade in Art, 34 STAN-
FORD L. REv. 275 (1981)]; R. DUFFY, ART LAW: REPRESENTING ARTISTS, DEALERS, AND COL-
LECTORS (1977); B. BURNHAM, THE ART CRISIS (1975).
2. See generally, supra note 1; see also J. HESS. THE GRAND ACQUISITORS (1974).
3. Id.
4. The first and most noted among these people is Dr. Clemency Coggins of Harvard
University. Dr. Coggins was first to bring the pervasive problem of the illegal taking and inter-
national sale of cultural property to the attention of the world.
5. The Cultural Property Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-446, 96 Stat. 2351
(1985) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2601 (1983)) [hereinafter cited as Cultural Property Act].
6. 118 CONG. REC. 27,924, 27,925 (1972).
7. For a discussion of the downfalls of earlier bills, see infra notes 98-101 and accom-
panying text.
8. See infra notes 231-37 and accompanying text.
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the law that is far from settled.9 In the United States, case law is not
conclusive and the enforcement policy of the U.S. Customs Service
still leaves open some areas of question."0 This comment will look
first at why this illicit traffic in cultural property is an area of con-
troversy and describe what competing interests are involved. Next
the actions that have been taken both on the international level and
unilaterally by the United States to counter and possibly solve the
problem will be examined. Finally, the still developing policy of the
United States will be reviewed and evaluated."
II. The Problem
Interest in art as an investment is a recent phenomenon.1" Eth-
nographic1" and ancient" art have proved to be especially big invest-
ment winners." This interest has sparked a rise in prices which in
turn has translated into an increase in the looting and pillaging of
archaeological sites 6 in areas with a rich cultural past.1 7 The matter
has simply become one of supply and demand.
The looting and theft of objects from burial mounds and tombs
has become so ingrained in the history of art-rich nations that names
have developed for those who participate in such activities. In Italy
these people are tombaroli; in South and Central America hua-
queros; and in Greece, the archeokepiloi.'8 The illicit digging that
goes on is by no means confined to art-rich areas, however. The
problem is international in scope, with sites even in the southwestern
United States routinely excavated and stripped of their valuable
objects.' 9
The means utilized in this destruction range from the innocent
discovery of objects in a farmer's field to the mass excavations of
major archaeological sites using heavy earthmoving and excavation
equipment.20 Similarly, costs of these excavations range from almost
9. See infra notes 212-37 and accompanying text.
10. See infra text of section V.B.
II. Commentary in this area is certainly not lacking; a number of respected experts
have emerged. Among them are James R. McAlee, Paul M. Bator, Leonard G. DuBoff, James
F. Fitzpatrick, James A.R. Nafziger, and John Henry Merryman.
12. B. BURHAM, THE ART CRISIS 191 (1975) [hereinafter cited as BURNHAM].
13. The term "ethnographic" refers to the branch of anthropology dealing with the
scientific description of individual cultures. THE RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 454
(rev. ed., 1982).
14. In this comment "ancient" refers to any object originating from any pre-industrial
society located anywhere in the world.
15. BURNHAM, supra note 12, at 120.
16. Id. at 14.
17. Especially affected are South and Central America, and those areas around the
Mediterranean which are rich in history.
18. Vitelli, The ABC's of the Art Market, EARLY MAN, Spring, 1982, at 29, 30.
19. See, Blair, Indian Rights: Native Americans Versus American Museums - A Bat-
tie for Artifacts, 7 AMER. INDIAN L. REV. 125 (1979).
20. Pendergast, Fighting a Losing Battle: Xuantunich, Belize, ARCHAEOLOGY, July-
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nothing up to the large amounts necessary for the mass excavations
that are allegedly financed by interests in Europe and North
America. 1 At times this $3 billion per year business" operates al-
most on the basis of made-to-order thefts, with dealers placing or-
ders with local "amateur" archaeologists.2
Persons involved in this business range from Peruvian farmers
who have turned to tomb robbing because of drought and economi-
cally depressed circumstances, "4 to international journalists and dip-
lomats who move objects across national borders, often under protec-
tion of the diplomatic pouch.2 5  Corrupt government cultural
officials26 and unscrupulous archaeological assistants have also been
implicated.2 7 Finally, groups such as museum officials and art deal-
ers have been accused of being involved in the illicit trade in
antiquities.
2 8
The era of the peasant who finds an object and unknowingly
sells it to a foreign dealer for a meager sum is gone.29 Illicit trading
in art objects has now become big business. It is estimated that be-
tween sixty and ninety percent of the items available are the fruits of
illicit excavations.30 While most of these objects have headed to the
United States, the most lucrative market for such items,31 others find
their way to Europe, Scandanavia, or Japan.
Interests in the debate for international and domestic legislation
on the import and export of cultural property range widely as can be
discerned from the discussion above. At one end are the dealers and
collectors of art, especially those dealing with ethnographic and
archaeological objects. On the other are both the officials of nations
with rich cultural heritage and the archaeologists. Originally caught
in the middle of this discussion were the ethnographic and art muse-
Aug. 1981, at 12 [hereinafter cited as Pendergast]; Reinhold, Theft and Vandalism: An
Archaeological Disaster, EXPEDITION, Summer 1973, at 2 [hereinafter cited as Reinhold].
21. McGuigan, Shannon, Wilkinson, and Malone, The Booming Trade in Smuggled
Art, NEWSWEEK, May 30, 1983, at 84 [hereinafter cited as NEWSWEEK].
22. P. BATOR, THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ART 16 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
BATOR].
23. See NEWSWEEK, supra note 21, at 85.
24. Id. at 84.
25. Id.
26. A European dealer estimates that 60 to 70% of the officials in the Orient who are
responsible for the preservation of antiquities are corrupt. BURNHAM, supra note 12, at 84.
27. See NEWSWEEK, supra note 21.
28. See J. HESS, THE GRAND ACQUISITORS (1974).
29. It is reported that even in remote areas auction house price lists concerning antiqui-
ties have been found. BURNHAM, supra note 12, at 103.
30. Id. at 95. Most of these items are small, metal objects. Responsibility for illicit
trading has been placed with the dealers because it is their money that supports this flow of art
objects. See also L. DuBOFF, ART LAW: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL, 289 (1975) [herein-
after cited as DuBOFF]; K. MEYER, THE PLUNDERED PAST, 124 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
MEYER].
31. NEWSWEEK, supra note 21, at 84.
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ums throughout the world that acquired and displayed objects with
provenances that are somewhat suspect.32 Recently, however, this
situation has changed. Various professional organizations in the mu-
seum field have adopted ethical standards aligning those organiza-
tions with the archaeological community and the officials of art-rich
nations. 33
A. Those Parties in Favor of Strict Regulation of the Interna-
tional Art Market: Archaeologists and Culturally Rich Nations
Some of the nations in the world that are culturally and histori-
cally the richest are also economically the poorest. These nations do
not have the resources to provide for their people's social and eco-
nomic welfare, let alone to protect the vast numbers of archaeologi-
cal sites and other cultural landmarks located within their borders
from pillage and plunder. 34 These nations, some of which spent a
great deal of time as colonies and have only recently become inde-
pendent, are generally referred to as non-aligned or lesser developed
nations. They are located mostly in Africa, Southeast Asia, and Cen-
tral and South America.3 5
An object of art is a great communicator and something of
unique value to a developing nation. Certain objects tell a people
who they are and what they have in common; a cultural heritage
helps to develop and satisfy a people's need for identity.36 This is the
major reason why such nations have a need and an interest in their
cultural patrimony.3 7 This need not only extends to objects presently
inside their borders, but also to those which have been removed by
colonial powers.3 8 Every object in the national museum of a colonial
power is a reminder to a former colony of those years during which
that foreign power imposed its rule.
Recently independent nations have attempted to develop a spirit
32. BURNHAM, supra note 12, at 191.
33. This discussion of the problems involved in the control of the international trade in
cultural properties is a quick survey at best. For a more detailed and explicit explanation, see
BATOR, supra note 22. For a very good, but involved discussion, see also Symposium on Inter-
national Art Law 15 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 757-900 (1984).
34. Mexico, a good example, has about 11,000 sites within its borders. It would take
lifetimes for an army of archaeologists to fully investigate each and every site. Physical protec-
tion of these sites is obviously impossible. Reinhold, supra note 20, at 5.
35. This, however, does not mean that the plundering of cultural landmarks is predomi-
nantly a problem of lesser developed nations. Nations interested in protecting their cultural
patrimony include the United States, Canada, New Zealand, Italy, and China.
36. DUBOFF, supra note 30, at 234.
37. See Comment, Emerging U.S. Policy with Regard to the International Movement
of National Cultural Property, 7 INT'L TRADE L.J. 166 (1982).
38. See infra notes 125-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of the repatriation
of objects of art. The most striking and continuing example of repatriation is the ongoing
conflict between Britain and Greece for the return of the so-called "Elgin Marbles." See infra
note 62 and accompanying text.
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of national unity and pride not only from works by contemporary
nationalistic artists, but by associating current regimes with ancient
tribal empires that once controlled the same land area.39 The politi-
cal benefits of such a practice have been proved throughout history.40
The continued taking of the national heritage of these nations only
compounds their political and social problems and illustrates their
subservience to European nations and the United States.41
What is most disheartening to officials of these developing na-
tions is that their own citizens are willfully taking part in this plun-
dering in the hope that they might earn a better living.'" The esti-
mates of the number of people in these nations who participate in
the illicit excavation and transportation of cultural property is as-
tounding. It is estimated that one percent of the entire population of
Costa Rica is involved in "amateur" archaeology."3 This translates
to more than 4,400 people.4 '
A second group in favor of restrictions on the flow of cultural
property are the professional, university trained archaeologists. 5
Their discipline has grown from the collection of "specimens" as an
academic curiosity to a modern science that carefully searches for
objects in hope of placing them in an archaeological context, solving
specific problems, and understanding the texture of human history
from which the object has emerged.'"
To an archaeologist a work of pre-Columbian 7 or classical' 8 art
is more than a piece of sculpture or a religious object. It is a unique
story and a part of a greater archaeological whole. When such an
object is removed from its original archaeological setting by those in
search of financial gain it becomes a mere curio, stripped of any edu-
cational value. It is pretty, perhaps, but has no story to tell.' 9
39. Examples include Nigeria and the West African empire of Benin, Mexico and the
Aztecs, and Peru and the Incas.
40. The best example of this is France under the rule of Napolean. The neo-classical
style of David's painting and of the architecture of Vignon, especially La Madeleine, was used
by Napolean to tie and associate his fledgling empire to the classicism and power of ancient
Greece and Rome.
41. Wardwell, Repatriation of Artworks: An Old Problem Resurfaces, ART IN
AMERICA, September, 1980, at 13.
42. See BURNHAM, supra note 12, at 127; NEWSWEEK, supra note 21.
43. Reinhold, supra note 20, at 6.
44. Id.
45. Archaeologists are not in any way united in supporting agreements and legislation
to generally restrict the international traffic in antiquities and art objects. See generally N.Y.
Times, Aug. 21, 1982, at A22, col. 5 (Letter to the Editor from Edward Munves, Jr.); N.Y.
Times, Oct. 19, 1982, at A30, col. 5 (Letter to the Editor from Bernard V. Bathmer).
46. See J. ACKERMAN, ART AND ARCHAEOLOGY 40 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
ACKERMAN].
47. "Pre-Columbian" refers to those items of Native American cultures that date prior
to 1500 A.D.
48. "Classical" works are those associated with either the Greek or Roman Empire.
49. Vitelli, Implementing the UNESCO Convention: A Challenge for Archaeologists,
45 AM. ANTIQUITY 558 (1980).
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After a site has been exploited for its most saleable objects the
archaeologist is left with the distasteful task known as "backdirt ar-
chaeology. °50 The ravaged site is cluttered with fragments of pot-
tery, human bones, and objects the looters have deemed unsaleable.5 1
The archaeologist's work then becomes more of a hopeless salvage
operation than any kind of careful excavation. In such a situation the
archaeological context and sequential relationships of the objects are
lost forever.5 2
B. The Dealers and Collectors: Toward Preserving the Free Flow
of Art
On the side of the argument favoring the free flow of cultural
property are the dealers in art and their clients who, for the most
part are private collectors.53 The arguments these dealers and private
collectors make against strict controls center upon concepts of free
trade and the free possession of personal property-two concepts
held dear by the United States and other western nations.54 Histori-
cally, this argument has a strong foundation. The United States has
subsidized the free movement of art since 1909 when the Payne-Al-
drich Tariff Act55 dissolved the import duty on works of art. This
Act is primarily responsible for the growth of the Metropolitan Mu-
seum of Art in New York and the National Gallery of Art, in Wash-
ington, D.C. into world-class museums such as they are today.56
Without the free flow of cultural property the United States would
have been unable to amass the rich collections that it now houses
within its borders.
Also argued is the point that restrictions on the international
market will be ineffective'because of inherent difficulties in enforce-
ment of this type of legislation. This argument stresses the idea that
any strict prohibition on import and export will only fuel a black
50. Pendergast, supra note 20.
51. Id.
52. See id. At an archaeological dig site soil is painstakingly removed in thin layers
and any artifacts found are noted and their positions recorded. Through this process an idea
and feel for the particular culture associated with that layer may be developed. If any object
were found in an unexpected layer, it would mean that there was some contact between that
civilization and another. See generally ACKERMAN, supra note 46.
53. See To Implement the UNESCO Convention on Cultural Property: Hearings on
H.R.3403 Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 48-54 (1979) (statement of Andre Emmerich, American Association of Dealers in An-
cient, Oriental, and Primitive Art) [hereinafter cited as Subcommittee Hearings].
54. See Comment, Current Practices and Problems in Combatting Illegality in the Art
Market, 12 SETON HALL L. REv. 506, 541 (1982).
55. Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, 36 Stat. 11, 81-82 (1909) (cited in
McAlee, From the Boston Raphael to Peruvian Pots: Limitations on the Importation of Art
Into The United States, 85 DICK. L. REV. 565, at 567 (1981) [hereinafter cited as McAlee].
56. See McAlee, supra note 55, at 568.
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market and fail to eradicate it." Such a restricted market, it is ar-
gued, would cause more illicit digging than it would prevent because
the objects would become more valuable as their scarcity increased.8
The whole idea of monetary value is emphasized by the dealers.
They generally believe that associating a dollar value with a work
will enhance that work's position in the eyes of society, insuring that
it will be preserved. 9 They feel that an object is better off displayed
in a museum or gallery in the United States or Europe than in a
storeroom in its native country.6
C. Caught in the Middle: The Museums of Ancient and Ethno-
graphic Art
Caught in the middle of this debate are the museums. On the
one hand they are dedicated to the preservation and display of ob-
jects of art. This is done through acquisitions, for the acquiring of
objects is the life-blood of any museum. Yet museums are also edu-
cational institutions and must share the moral obligations and values
society requires of such institutions. Because of this obligation, ethics
in museum acquisitions and operations must be defined and main-
tained.61 For example, the argument is made that artworks are bet-
ter off in a Western museum. In industrialized nations preservation
techniques are more advanced, the object is accessible to more schol-
ars and the general population for study, and security and protection
of the work are better."
This demonstrates the museum's dilemma. How aggressive
should a museum's acquisition policy be? To what extent should an
object's provenance and importance to its country of origin be con-
57. See generally Merryman, International Art Law: From Cultural Nationalism to a
Common Cultural Heritage, 15 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 757 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
International Art Law].
58. Schneider, Plunder or Excavation? Observations and Suggestions on the Regula-
tion of Ownership and Trade in the Evidence of Cultural Patrimony, 9 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L.
& COMM. 1, 6 (1982).
59. See supra note 53.
60. Id.
61. See generally ASSOCIATION OF ART MUSEUM DIRECTORS, PROFESSIONAL PRAC-
TICES IN ART MUSEUMS (1981).
62. The most frequently cited example in support of this preservation argument in-
volves the so-called "Elgin Marbles" case. The "Elgin Marbles" were 247 of the original 524
feet of friezes from the Parthenon in Athens that were taken from Greece in 1801 and 1803 by
Lord Elgin for his country home in England. Eventually, all of these works ended up in the
British Museum and are in excellent condition today. The Parthenon, however, has not fared
as well, having been blown up in the early nineteenth century when used as a Turkish muni-
tions dump, ravaged by tourists, and most recently attacked by that major threat to many of
the world's cultural monuments - air pollution. See Daniel, Editorial ANTIQUITY, Mar.,
1982, at 2; Greece is Pressing Britain for Return of Antiquities, N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1982,
at A25, col. 1.
In addition, horror stories have been told of ancient monuments and pyramids being used
for target practice and being ground up for roadbed because it was cheaper than importing
gravel. Reinhold, supra note 20, at 5.
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sidered? Should a museum decline to acquire a particularly impor-
tant work because of questionable origin and risk the loss of that
object to the scholarly community indefinitely? Clearly these are
problems which are not easily resolved.
The preservation theory is also a strong counter argument to
those who advocate the importance of national patrimony.63 A corol-
lary to the preservation idea is that certain works comprise the cul-
tural heritage of all western civilization and therefore should be
readily accessible to as many people of as many nations as possible.64
Additionally, certain objects taken from one nation have become a
part of the national patrimony of the nation that currently possesses
them. 65 This national identification with a work of art emphasizes
the concept that art is not only a medium for the communication of
ideas, it also provides for the cross-fertilization of cultures. In short,
objects of art prove valuable for all parties involved.66
III. The UNESCO Convention on the Protection of Cultural Prop-
erty: A Unified Response to the Pillage of Cultural Property
A. The International Response
Fifty-three nations are presently parties to the 1970 UNESCO
Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property,6 7 the most recent
being the United States which became a signatory state on January
12, 1983.68 Although there has been talk of France also implement-
ing the Convention,69 as of this writing no such action has been
taken, nor is any expected in the near future.7"
The Convention grew out of a number of international agree-
ments, starting with a League of Nations resolution in 1922.71 The
purpose of most of these prior agreements was to protect cultural
property during wartime. The 1970 Convention is therefore unique
in that its purpose is to provide for the protection of objects in time
63. See supra notes 34-52 and accompanying text.
64. See BATOR, supra note 22, at 27-32.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 29. As an example, the value of primitive art and African art in particu-
lar to modern painting is immeasurable. This can most easily be seen in Picasso's "Les
Desmoiselles d'Avignon."
67. UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Im-
port, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, No. 11806, 823
U.N.T.S. 231 (1972), reprinted in 10 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 289 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
UNESCO Convention].
68. Cultural Property Act, supra note 5.
69. Bolla, Keynote Address: The UNESCO Convention on Illicit Traffic of Art, 15
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 765, 769 (1983).
70. Conversation with Geoffrey R. Scott, Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law,
Carlisle, Pennsylvania (Feb. 27, 1985).
71. Prott, International Control of Illicit Movement of the Cultural Heritage: The
1970 UNESCO Convention and Some Possible Alternatives, 10 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM.
333, 337 (1983).
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of peace as well as in time of war. Moreover, contrary to prior agree-
ments, the UNESCO Convention provides protection for objects
other than those of monumental quality.72
The Convention defines three classifications of cultural property
to be protected. The protected classes are: those items crucial to a
nation's cultural past as designated by that particular nation'7 those
items placed on exhibit in museums and secular or religious public
monuments,74 and those items of a nation's cultural patrimony that
are in immediate danger of pillage.7
The first distinction is quite broad and rather loosely con-
structed. It is broad in that it categorizes cultural property into ten
different areas. 76 It is also a loose definition in that it allows a signa-
tory state to unilaterally make distinctions concerning the relative
importance of its cultural property.
The second classification of cultural property protects items that
might obviously be subject to theft and be resold in another coun-
try. 77 Provisions in the third definition of cultural property that call
for the protection of items in imminent danger of pillage are
designed to deal with emergency situations such as the case with
Mayan stelae in the early 1970 1S78 and the protection of cultural
landmarks endangered by war.79
The means of protection called for by the Convention consist of
a system of import and export restrictions implemented by signatory
states which requires a high degree of international cooperation.8"
The power to create such restrictions is left to the governments of
each nation.8" Signatories agree that authorization and export certifi-
cates are called for before any object may leave a particular na-
tion. 82 On import restrictions, the parties to the Convention agree to
respect and enforce the export regulations of other signatory na-
72. See UNESCO Convention, supra note 67, at art. 1.
73. Id.
74. Id. at art. 7(b)(i).
75. Id. at art. 1.
76. One such category, for example, includes items that may be relevant to a nation's
historical or artistic heritage. Id. at art. 9.
77. Id. at art. 7.
78. Id. at art. 9. A stela (pl. stelae) is an upright stone slab or pillar bearing an inscrip-
tion or design that serves as a monument, marker, or the like. RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE
DICTIONARY 1286 (rev. ed. 1982).
In the late 1960's and early 1970's stelae located in Mexico and Central America were
attacked by profit seekers using chain saws and sledge hammers. These pillagers cut off the
carved faces, broke them into more manageable pieces, and smuggled them out of Mexico,
Guatemala, and other Central American countries for the purpose of selling them at a hand-
some profit. See U.S. v. Hollingshead, 495 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1974); Reinhold, supra note
20, at 2.
79. See UNESCO Convention, supra note 67, at art. 11.
80. Id. at art. 2.
81. Id. at art. 6.
82. Id. at art. 5.
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tions.83 Provisions for educational and preservation programs are set
forth in an effort to make the people of the signatory states more
aware of the value of their cultural patrimony.8
Provisions in the Convention dealing with import restrictions
and definitions of stolen objects are the provisions that cause the
most difficulty for the wealthy art-consuming nations.85 Nations in
Europe, North America, and Japan are the principle markets for the
objects that leave the culturally rich yet economically poor nations
that are the moving forces in UNESCO. If an absolutely free mar-
ket were to be permitted it would be dominated by wealth and the
poor would be helpless to prevent or control this trading. Essentially
this is the basis upon which the international antiquities market has
operated until recently. The UNESCO Convention is an attempt at
a concerted effort to try to control the situation.8"
B. United States Participation: The UNESCO Convention and its
Implementing Legislation
On January 12, 1983 the United States implemented the 1970
UNESCO Convention and became a fully participatory state
party.87 UNESCO was established in 1945 as the United Nations
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization. In the last few
years, however, it has moved toward the left, becoming a forum for
non-aligned and Eastern Bloc nations.88 The targets for most of the
ideological attacks waged during UNESCO proceedings are the
United States and Israel. 89 Because of these attacks and the fact
that it believed UNESCO was mismanaged, 90 the United States ter-
minated its membership on December 31, 1984 and stopped making
its large contributions to the payment of UNESCO's expenses.91
The fact that the United States is no longer a UNESCO mem-
ber does not, however, mean that there has been any change in
83. Id.
84. Id. at art. 10.
85. See infra text accompanying notes 194-237.
86. Of the 53 nations who have become parties to the UNESCO Convention, only the
United States, Canada, and possibly Italy can be considered "art-consuming" nations.
87. Convention on Cultural Property Law, title III 19 U.S.C. § 2601-2613 (1982). See
Cultural Property Act, supra note 5.
88. See Rabinowitz, UNESCO Wordfest: The West Loses, Again, Wall St. J., August
24, 1982, at 28, col. I; Culture Vultures, Wall St. J., August 9, 1982, at 12, col. 1.
89. See supra note 88. Of the 200 resolutions passed at the 1982 Mexico meeting on
cultural property, few, if any, had anything to do with cultural property and its protection.
Most of these resolutions condemned or attempted to condemn acts by the United States or
Israel. See id.
90. See Washington Post, January 1, 1985, at 1, col. 5; N.Y. Times, December 20,
1984, at A I, col. 6.
91. Id. 80% of UNESCO's budget was spent at UNESCO's Paris office so only 20%
was left to be spent on actual programs. The United States had been paying 25% of
UNESCO's $187 million budget.
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United States policy concerning the Cultural Property law signed by
President Reagan.92 The American withdrawal certainly weakens
the force of UNESCO as a world organization, 93 but it does not
have any effect on the Cultural Property Act. The legislation is still
in effect and will remain on the books indefinitely.
The Cultural Property Implementation Act of the United
States94 that was signed into law was not, however, the full text of
the UNESCO Convention. Only sections (7) and (9) of the Conven-
tion text were implemented and with some modifications. These are
the sections that deal with stolen property and import restrictions in
crisis situations.95 The decision to accept the Convention only as
modified was a compromise designed to balance the interests of the
various groups that lobbied strongly for and against regulation.9
The fact that it took ten years from the time of approval by the
Senate9" in 1972 to the time the Act was finally implemented in
1983, is testament to the fact that the battle was hard fought.
Bills to implement the Convention were introduced in the 93rd
Congress in 1973 and in each successive session through the 97th
Congress. 98 The major criticism of the bills which failed, was that
they went too far beyond the original scope of the UNESCO Con-
vention and called for United States action even in the absence of
concerted international action. 99 The final bill as enacted does pro-
vide for unilateral action, but only in emergency situations and with
a presidential directive based on appropriate procedures. 10
The Act in its final form was a rider on an omnibus tariff bill
passed at the very end of the 97th Congress. No hearings were held
92. See supra note 87.
93. Hoving, Politics, Art, and Gabble, 212 CONNOISSEUR 14 (1982).
94. See supra parts II A, B, and C.
95. The Cultural Property Act, supra note 5, has provisions that call for the Cultural
Property Advisory Committee to advise the President on emergency situation requests by sig-
natory nations, e.g., § 306. The Act also requires any signatory nation to have taken steps on
its own to protect its cultural heritage before any request for such restrictions will be honored.
96. See text of sections II, IIA, B and C.
97. For Senate approval, see 118 CONG. REc. 27,924-25 (1972).
98. Past bills include: H.R. 3403, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 5643, 95th Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1977); H.R. 14171; 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); and S. 2677, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973).
99. See materials cited supra note 58.
100. Cultural Property Act, supra note 5, at § 305. These "appropriate measures" are
spelled out in §§304-07 of the Act. To be considered for import restrictions, an archaeological
object must be of cultural significance, at least 250 years old and normally discovered as a
result of scientific excavation, accidental digging or exploration on land or under water. An
ethnographic object must be the product of a tribal or nonindustrial society and important to
the cultural heritage of a people.
The United States received its first request for protection of objects under this legislation
on October 2, 1985. The request came from Canada and involved Canadian Indian artifacts.
Canada's written request was accompanied by documentation on the extent of the need for
assistance as is required by the Act. Canada Files First Request to U.S. for Protection of
Endangered Artifacts, Aviso, Nov. 1985, at 1.
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because they would have delayed a vote until after the close of the
session, effectively ruining any chance of passage.1"1
To fully understand the reasoning behind the Cultural Property
Act it is necessary to examine the legislative history of all previous
bills on the subject.1 02 In the hearings on each of the unsuccessful
attempts at passage the direction of the testimony was identical and
the people or groups who testified were generally the same. The deal-
ers in ancient and ethnographic art testified in opposition to the bill;
the archaeological community supported it. Throughout these hear-
ings the Administration urged passage. 10 3
During each of the hearings testimony against the earlier bills
centered mainly upon the fact that no art-importing nation other
than Canada10 4 had implemented the Convention. The bill was
thought to be a hopeless act of self-denial by the United States. It
was believed that any objects originally destined for the United
States would merely be rerouted to other art-importing nations.' 05
Proposed revisions also included a better defined and simpler
system of repose for objects currently in this country,106 and a provi-
sion for the reimbursement of a good faith purchaser who stood to
forfeit an illicitly obtained object as would normally be provided for
in a business purchase context.107 These particular provisions were
not contained in the Cultural Property Act as finally enacted and
questions concerning these issues remain unresolved. Lobbying ef-
forts for new legislation that would fully satisfy these and other in-
terests are still ongoing. 108
IV. Other Methods of Protecting Cultural Heritage: Bilateral
Agreements, Civil Suits, Import and Export Regulations, and Non-
Governmental Attempts at Control
A. Bilateral Agreements
Some commentators believe that because bilateral agreements
can be tailored to a specific problem, they are the most effective
means of controlling the international art market. 0 9 The needs of
each unique party may be better served by such an agreement. How-
101. See Miscellaneous Tariff Bills, 1982: Hearings on S. 1723 Before the Subcomm. on
Int'l Trade of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 431-474, 549-569 (1982).
102. See materials cited supra note 88.
103. See generally id.
104. Possibly Italy should be included.
105. See generally Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 53, at 38-54.
106. See id. at 87-91 (Statements of Metropolitan Museum of Art).
107. Id. at 86; see also U.C.C. § 2-403 (1977).
108. See infra text accompanying notes 231-37.
109. Nafziger, The New International Legal Framework for the Return, Restitution or
Forfeiture of Cultural Property, 15 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 789, 812 (1983) [hereinafter
cited as Nafziger].
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ever, critics argue that such agreements are used, at least in the
United States, more as bargaining chips for agreements on issues the
State Department sees as more substantive and crucial to the inter-
ests of the United States than for the protection of the cultural patri-
mony of poorer nations."'
These bilateral agreements vary in form. The agreement may be
in the form of a treaty, such as the one the United States signed
with Mexico in 1970.111 An executive agreement is another type of
arrangement used to deal with the protection of cultural property.
The best example of an executive agreement entered into for this
purpose is that signed by the United States and Peru in 1981.111
Finally, a much more idealistic form of bilateral agreement is exem-
plified by the agreement between Zaire and Belgium that has been
in effect for approximately fifteen years. 13 A developing nation like
Zaire may gain much from such an agreement although this is not
always the case.""
The treaty between the United States and Mexico" 5 provides
for the protection of objects of "outstanding importance to the na-
tional patrimony" of either nation by providing for the return of ob-
jects that were taken from one of the two nations to the other by
inappropriate means." 6 Under the treaty each nation pledges to pro-
mote educational and preservation activities concerning cultural
property' 7 and take affirmative legal action when the situation war-
rants it." 8 This could involve either a civil suit in the name of Mex-
ico in a United States District Court or the use of diplomatic pres-
sure for the return of a particular object or group of objects. 1 9
Similarly the United States' executive agreement with Peru'20
provides for the return of cultural property. The agreement does not,
however, have any substantive effect on the existing laws of either
110. The common complaint in disputes with South and Central American nations is
that a cultural property treaty is merely a bargaining chip in the war against drugs. It is
claimed that the United States agrees to sign cultural treaties only if the other signatory re-
sponds by signing a drug enforcement treaty. Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 53, at 50.
11I. Treaty Providing for the Recovery and Return of Stolen Archaeological, Historical
and Cultural Properties, July 17, 1970, United States-Mexico, 22 U.S.T. 494, T.I.A.S. No.
7088 [hereinafter cited as U.S.-Mexico Treaty].
I 12. Agreement Respecting the Recovery and Return of Stolen Archaeological, Histori-
cal and Cultural Properties, Sept, 15, 1981, United States-Peru, T.I.A.S. No. 10136 [hereinaf-
ter cited as Executive Agreement].
113. Nofziger, supra note 109, at 810; Wardell, Repatriation of Artworks: An Old
Problem Resurfaces, ART IN AMERICA, Sept., 1980, at 17.
114. See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 101.
116. U.S.-Mexico Treaty, supra note 111, at art. I.
117. Id. at art. 1I.
118. Id. at art. III.
119. Id.
120. Executive Agreement, supra note 112.
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country. 121 This agreement is an executive agreement and not a
treaty. No legislative action implementing the agreement has been
taken as there was with the Mexican Treaty. 22 Nevertheless, the
agreement parallels the Treaty and requires that each country pro-
vide the legal means necessary for the recovery of cultural property
that has been removed from the jurisdiction of either one of the sig-
natories.' Most significantly, the agreement does not authorize le-
gal action by the United States on behalf of Peru to enforce the
agreement. 24
The best way to protect a developing nation's cultural heritage
and to repatriate items removed by a former colonial power is exem-
plified by the agreement between Belgium and Zaire.2 5 Since 1970,
these two nations have been working together to return objects taken
from Zaire during Belgium's tenure as a colonial power. 26 Not only
does Zaire receive items from Belgian museums that are essential to
its cultural heritage, but Belgium also sends technicians to help es-
tablish and maintain a Zairean museological corps. Although this
solution may be criticized as too idealistic, 2 7 it goes to the source of
the problem and attempts to correct it by education as well as proper
administration and control over cultural resources. 28
B. Civil Suits for the Return of Cultural Property29
When a major piece of cultural property is discovered in a for-
eign nation, the nation deprived of that work may choose to bring a
civil suit for its return in the nation where the work is currently lo-
cated.'30 Success, however, may be much more difficult to obtain
than one might expect. The nation filing the suit must submit itself
121. Truslow, Peru's Recovery of Cultural Patrimony, 15 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
839, 846 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Truslow].
122. Senate ratification of the U.S.-Mexico Treaty occurred on February 10, 1971.
123. Executive Agreement, supra note 112, at art. 11(2); Truslow, supra note 121, at
846, n.35.
124. Executive Agreement, supra note 112. This is explained by the distinction between
an executive agreement and a treaty.
125. See supra note 113.
126. Repatriation of items taken during periods of colonialism has been viewed as the
most complex and delicate issue that museums will face in the next few years. WEIL, BEAUTY
AND THE BEASTS 106 (1983).
127. It is rumored that returned items have been spotted for sale on the open market.
Daniel, Editorial, ANTIQUITY, Mar. 1982, at 2.
128. Id. It has been pointed out that a policy of allowing some of the works of a former
colony to be repatriated would appease the recently independent nation and allow the former
colonizer to keep some of the objections which it had.
129. Since litigation involving cultural property has many aspects and complications,
this section will deal with only those problems relating to the comparatively simple inter-
pleader action to quiet title on a disputed object. See infra notes 197-98 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the more complicated litigation issues such as the definition of "stolen"
in a cultural property context relating to export restrictions.
130. This procedure is not limited to actions initiated be nations; an individual may also
bring such a suit. See Winkworth v. Christie, Manson and Woods Ltd. [1980] Al l E.R. 1121.
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to an unfamiliar judicial system, go through the expense of securing
foreign counsel, and proceed with what may very well be protracted
and costly litigation.
The problems of litigation unique to cases involving works of art
must also be considered. Because most of these objects travel easily
and frequently across international borders and may very well be
hundreds of years old, title is an obvious problem. Jurisdictional
questions, as well as conflict and choice of law questions, also cause
difficulties for litigants in these suits.13' The most troublesome prob-
lem associated with litigation involving title to works of art, however,
is the statute of limitations-when it begins to run and when it is
tolled.
Notwithstanding these many difficulties, countries subject them-
selves to the problems associated with civil suits and the recovery of
cultural property. Their purpose is to show strength and make the
point that their particular nation will not stand for the pillage of its
cultural past. A civil suit, in the form of an interpleader action, is
the most common type of action brought by these nations in an at-
tempt to settle title disputes in common law countries such as the
United States.
A recent case which illustrates many of these problems and
which has evoked extensive commentary is Kunstsammlugen zu
Weimar v. Elicofon.1 32 Parties to this case included an East German
art museum (KZW), a Brooklyn lawyer, and the Grand-Duchess of
Saxony-Weimar. Each party had a claim to two Diirer paintings and
each claim was based on a different body of law. 133 The United
131. See generally Jurisdictional Issues in the International Movement of Cultural
Property: 20th Annual Regional Meeting of the American Society of International Law 10
SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 279 (1983).
132. 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982) [hereinafter cited as KZW v. Elicofon]. See Note,
International Law in Domestic Forums: The State of the Art, 9 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 179
(1983); Note, Property Law: International Stolen Art, 23 HARV. INT'L L.J. 466 (1983); Note,
Kunstammlugen zu Weimer v. Elicofon. Theft of Priceless Art Treasures Gives Rise to Pro-
tracted International Legal Battle, 19 TEXAS INT'L L.J. 189 (1984). For discussion and expla-
nation, see Maitland, From Schwarzburg to Flatbush, ARTNEWS, Sept. 1981, at 78.
The KZW case involved two works painted in 1499 by Northern Renaissance painter
Albrecht DUrer. These works were rare for two reasons; first, because there are few surviving
Dirers, and second, because they were oil on wood panel. Although challenged by the Grand
Duchess, the works passed from the state collection of Saxony-Weimar to Germany by an act
of legislation in 1918. They were exhibited in Germany until 1943 when they were hidden in a
castle to protect them from allied bombings. When the castle fell to the Allies in 1945, the
paintings disappeared. Without knowing the value of the two works a Brooklyn lawyer by the
name of Elicofon purchased them from a former G.I. in 1946 for $450. Not until 1966 did
Elicofon find out that these paintings were worth $6 million. The action to recover the paint-
ings was originally filed in 1969 in the United States by the Federal Republic of Germany
(West Germany), then the only German government recognized by the United States. In 1974
the United States recognized the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) and the East
Germany Museum Kunstammlugen zu Weimer (KZW) was allowed to proceed with the suit.
133. Interestingly, KZW's claim was based on the law of the State of New York which
did not allow purchasers to receive good title from a thief. Elicofon's claim was based on
German law concerning the passing of good title from the custodian of the painting in Ger-
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States District Court in New York used New York State law to de-
cide the case in favor of the museum. T3
KZW v. Elicofon also involved the issue of the tolling of the
statute of limitations in an art litigation context. Elicofon claimed
that he should be granted title because of twenty years of uninter-
rupted good faith possession starting with his good faith purchase in
1946.135 The court ruled against this, however, and said that the
statute was tolled until the demand was made for the return of the
two paintings in 1966.136 This concept is generally referred to as the
"demand-refusal" rule. KZW v. Elicofon illustrates the complicated
nature of any legal proceeding involving the protection and return of
cultural property stolen from one country and illicitly transported to
another."' 7
O'Keeffe v. Snyder"8' is another case that brings out problems
that may be encountered when attempting to quiet title to a work of
art. The question in this case concerned the tolling of the statute of
limitations in a situation involving an adversely possessed chattel.
The court's decision rested on what actions constituted open and no-
torious possession of a painting by an innocent purchaser. The New
Jersey court ruled that display in the private home of the purchaser
was not enough; the possession had to be more public. In other
words, the painting had to be exhibited in a gallery. Although this
ruling has been criticized,'3 9 the court justified its decision on the
reasoning O'Keeffe could not have possibly known where the works
were and who possessed them without a display more public than in
a private living room. 40
Particularly important to the decision in O'Keeffe is the question
of the statute of limitations, how long it is tolled and when it begins
to run in an adverse possession case involving a chattel. This ques-
tion was the major issue on appeal in the New Jersey Superior and
Supreme Courts.14' The majority in the Superior Court placed the
many, to the G.I., then to Elicofon. The Grand-Duchess' claim was based on nineteenth cen-
tury German dynastic law that distinguished sovereign property from personal property. See
supra note 132.
134. Federal Republic of Germany v. Elicofon, 536 F.Supp. 813 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
135. 678 F.2d 1150, at 1160.
136. Id. at 1160-62.
137. Admittedly, KZW v. Elicofon does not involve the international movement of an-
tiquities, but it does demonstrate some problems that are encountered in suits involving
archaeological and ethnographic material - the principle subject matter dealt with in this
comment.
138. 83 N.J. 478, 416 A.2d 862 (1980). This case involved noted American twentieth
century abstract artist Georgia O'Keeffe and the theft in 1946 of three of her paintings from a
gallery owned by her husband, photographer Alfred Stieglitz.
139. See Comment, The Recovery of Stolen Art: Of Paintings, Statues, and Statutes of
Limitation. 27 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1122 (1980).
140. 170 N.J. Super. 75, 84, 405 A.2d 840, 844 (1979).
141. See id.; see also supra note 138.
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date on which the statute began to run as the date on which all
elements of adverse possession were met. 42 Thus the statute was
tolled until 1976 when O'Keeffe located the works in a New York
gallery, thirty years after they were originally stolen.14 3 Plaintiff
could not have filed suit to reclaim the paintings any earlier because
she had no idea who was holding them.
The running of the statute is now handled in much the same
manner as statute of limitations questions in tort suits. The statute
will be tolled until the particular offense is discovered by the injured
party who them must use due diligence in pursuing the claim.44
This rule shifts the emphasis from the conduct of the possessor to the
conduct of the original owner. 4 5 It was because of this rule that the
Superior Court decision in favor of O'Keeffe was reversed and re-
manded by the New Jersey Supreme Court. The question of when
the theft occurred and whether O'Keeffe exercised due diligence in
pursuing her claim still needed to be resolved. 46
C. Export Restrictions
With the United States the only major exception, every nation
in the world protects its cultural patrimony through export restric-
tions. 4 7 These nations value their cultural heritage very highly and
wish to make every effort to protect it.' 48 Restrictions may be as
loose as they are in Switzerland, West Germany, or The Nether-
lands, or they may be extremely restrictive as they are in Greece,
Mexico, and Peru. The latter nations have nationalized certain cate-
gories of cultural property so that removal of any object from the
country, even after a legitimate purchase, is difficult and requires
export certificates and other clearances, if export is permitted at
all.' 49
Generally the objects and works most heavily protected by ex-
port legislation are Old Masters and pre-Columbian antiquities. 50
Objects that are the easiest to export are twentieth century works by
142. The elements of adverse possession include possession that is continuous, adverse,
notorious, open, and exclusive.
143. 170 N.J. Super. at 89, 405 A.2d at 847.
144. 83 N.J. at 498, 416 A.2d at 872.
145. Id.
146. 83 N.J. at 493-494, 505, 416 A.2d at 870, 877.
147. In addition to the United States, the only nations that do not have export restric-
tions on art objects are Denmark, Uganda, Singapore, and Togo. BATOR, supra note 22, at 38
n.71.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 32-37.
149. See generally B. BURNHAM, HANDBOOK OF NATIONAL LEGISLATION (1974); BA-
TOR, supra note 22, at 38 n.72.
150. Grant, Miseries and Masterpieces, CONNOISSEUR, Sept. 1983, at 25 [hereinafter
cited as Grant].
Fall 19851
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
living artists.151 In examining such legislation, interests of nations
rich in cultural heritage must be considered. Most nations are inter-
ested in protecting their cultural heritage for nationalistic reasons.
At the same time, however, they try to use works of art as good will
ambassadors to foster international relations. 152 Protective legislation
attempts to balance these interests so that those works most essential
to a nation's heritage are those most stringently protected while
those that a nation would like to make most visible have fewer re-
strictions placed on their international movement.
A good example of a restrictive export law on cultural property
that works, yet is not oppressive, is that of Great Britain. 53 The
British act provides for the protection of cultural property through
the requirement of an export license for all works which are valued
over £8000 or are over fifty years old.154 If a work to be exported
falls within these limits and fits the additional requirements concern-
ing its importance to British heritage and education,1 55 the license
will be withheld to give the nation itself the opportunity to buy and
retain the work by matching the purchase price. Funds for this are
provided by the National Heritage Memorial Fund, the Henry
Moore Foundation, and other private concerns acting in the British
national interest.156 Works purchased in this manner are generally
retained by British museums.1 57
The retention of cultural property through these purchase provi-
sions does not block all exports. If the price paid is not matched, the
license will be granted and the work will be permitted to leave the
country. 158 This occurs in over thirty percent of the cases where the
151. Id.
152. See supra notes 34-44 and accompanying text.
153. Stat. Inst. 1981 No. 1641 (Great Britain).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See generally DUFFY, ART LAW: REPRESENTING ARTISTS, DEALERS, AND COLLEC-
TORS 359-360; Bennett and Brand, Conservation, Control and Heritage - Public Law and
Portable Antiquities, 12 ANGLO-AMERICAN L.R. 141 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Bennett and
Brand].
157. Most recently the Fund has provided money for the purchase of a painting by Duc-
cio, and drawings by Rubens, Raphael, and Rembrandt originally purchased by the J. Paul
Getty Museum in Malibu, California. Although these works were not produced by British
artists, they have been in British hands for generations and have become a part of the cultural
heritage of Great Britain. Britannia's Export Law Rules, 72 ART IN AMERICA, Oct. 1984, at
248; Thomas, Museum is Battling to Keep a Painting in Britain, N.Y. Times, July 28, 1984,
at II, col. I. This fund system is considered a success by many authorities and was the model
for a similar statute in Canada. Cultural Property Export and Import Act, ch. 50, 1974-75-76
Con. Stat. 1155. See Clark, The Cultural Property Export and Import Act of Canada: Legis-
lation to Encourage National Cooperation, 15 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 771 (1983) [herein-
after cited as Clark]. See also Bennett and Brand, supra note 156, at 169. Contra supra N.Y.
Times, July 28, 1984, at 11, col. I.
158. The practice in drafting contracts that involve works subject to a statute with a
retention provision such as Britain's is to make the transaction contingent upon the granting of
an export license.
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license is not immediately granted. 15
The success of the British statute is tied to the fact that it pro-
tects the works most essential to British national heritage while at
the same time allowing for some export. Export restrictions similar
to those in the British statute predominate in the major nations of
Europe, although they may be much more restrictive.'" 0
Statutes far more restrictive than that of Great Britain and
widely criticized by authorities in the United States have been en-
acted in nations such as Mexico and Peru. 6' These countries have
nationalized their cultural property and claim that any export consti-
tutes a violation of national law. 6 2 International legal authorities
consider these laws complicated and ambiguous, causing problems
not only for the governments that enacted them but also for those
nations in which the importation of art is "big business." Nations
such as the United States have particular interest in the effect of
these laws because the objects to be protected generally end up in
museums and private collections within their borders, making the
possessors violators of foreign law.
The basic argument asserted against these strict export laws is
that they contradict the traditional views on personal property held
by the United States and other art-importing nations.163 With these
statutes ownership is based on acts of national legislation and not on
the common law concepts of personal property at the foundations of
Anglo-American law. This conflict is at the heart of all the problems
which have recently developed in relation to import and export re-
strictions on cultural property around the world, particularly in the
area of pre-Columbian antiquities. 64
Although the intent of countries which nationalize cultural
property is to protect that property, the effect of strict export laws
may very well be further pillage of objects from illicit dig sites and
theft from understaffed and underfunded museums. Critics point out
that a complete bar to export creates and perpetuates the black mar-
ket in these objects and that protection is therefore not enhanced.16 5
A respected authority in this area, John Henry Merryman of
Stanford University, has noted that although it is within the power
of any nation to enact whatever protective legislation it wants no
159. Bennett and Brand, supra note 156, at 165.
160. Grant, supra note 150, at 25.
161. See also New Antiquities Law, 3 STOLEN ART ALERT 2 (1982) (discussing the
recent nationalization by Costa Rica of cultural property).
162. See generally BATOR, supra note 22.
163. See generally International Art Law, supra note 57; Merryman, Trading in Art:
Cultural Nationalism versus Internationalism, 18 STAN. LAWYER, Spring, 1984, at 24.
164. See infra note 217 and accompanying text.
165. See International Art Law, supra note 57.
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matter how unreasonable, 16 6 there are five particular problems that
will be caused by oppressively restrictive export regulations.16 7 The
first of these problems is that any excavation or export of cultural
property will be carried out covertly, callously, and anonymously.
Secondly, the income from the trade in these objects will ultimately
go to the wrong people. Merryman notes that a proper representa-
tion of various national cultures would not be made available to
world museums, corruption and frustration would permeate the
ranks of national police and customs officials, scholars, and museum
personnel, and the most valuable works would leave their countries
of origin illicitly.168
D. Import Restrictions
For any system of export restrictions to be effective, an interna-
tional system of import regulations is necessary. Potential importing
nations must recognize and aid in enforcing restrictions imposed by
other countries. By restricting imports, a potential importing nation
emphasizes its own policy against accepting the illegal export of
goods from a sister nation. If potential importing nations fail to re-
spect other nations' restrictions, all enforcement of export regula-
tions is left with the country of origin and the results may prove
disastrous.' 69
Some of the problems which may arise when one nation refuses
to respect the export restrictions of another are exemplified in the
case of Attorney General of New Zealand v. Ortiz. 70 In this British
case, the government of New Zealand attempted to enforce a viola-
tion of a New Zealand statute which claimed certain classes of cul-
tural property essential to the country's history. 17 The statute was
implemented to insure the protection of items created by the Maori,
an aboriginal tribe native to New Zealand.1 72
The statute in question required permission from the govern-
ment before any item of New Zealand's cultural heritage could be
removed, and if a violation were to occur, the item was to be for-
166. Id. at 758.
167. Id. at 759.
168. Id.
169. See supra text of section III C.
170. 2 W.L.R. 10 (Q.B. 1982), rev'd 3 All E.R. 432 (C.A. 1982), affid 2 All E.R. 95
(H.L. 1983).
171. New Zealand Historic Articles Act, 1962, ch. 37, 1962 N.Z. stat. (This has been
replaced by the Antiquities Act, 1975, ch. 41, 1975 N.Z. stat.) [hereinafter cited as Articles
Act].
172. The facts of the case involve the illegal export from New Zealand of a series of
large wood-carved panels from the Maori civilization. These panels had been buried in a
swamp for some time. They were purchased by a London collector, Ortiz, and offered for
resale at a London auction house. The government of New Zealand attempted to enjoin the
sale and filed to have the objects returned.
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feited to the Crown of New Zealand."73 The British trial court ruled
in favor of New Zealand on the ground that the item was automati-
cally forfeited upon its exit from New Zealand because title was
vested in the Crown while the object was still in New Zealand.17 On
appeal the decision was reversed. The appellate court found that
there were three types of foreign laws that a British court could not
enforce. The first two were revenue and penal laws. As noted at the
trial level, British courts will not collect taxes or inflict punishments
prescribed under a foreign jurisdiction. 75 The trial court's decision,
however, was reversed on the ground that the 1962 New Zealand
Act was a foreign public law which is the third category of law un-
enforceable in an English court.1 76 Despite New Zealand's claim
that its law provided for the automatic confiscation of illegally ex-
ported items and was therefore not a public law, the British Court of
Appeal viewed this as a sovereign act by a foreign state which could
not be enforced under the English judicial system.' 1 New Zealand
was not permitted to exercise any sovereign authority beyond its own
territorial limits.1 78
A further appeal went to the House of Lords where the issue
became one of statutory interpretation. 179 Title to the carvings had
not vested in the government of New Zealand before they were
taken from the country the House of Lords declared, so there was no
property right that Could be enforced in England.180 Although the
basis for the decision in the House of Lords differed from that of the
Court of Appeal, the result was affirmed. 8 '
The decision in the Ortiz case clearly demonstrates a need for
international cooperation if there is to be effective control over the
illicit trade in cultural property. This cooperation is best achieved
through multilateral agreements.182 It is in this spirit that the
UNESCO Convention was drafted and one commentator has sug-
gested that if New Zealand and Great Britain had also been parties
to the Convention at the time Ortiz was decided, the case would
have had a different result. This is because there would have been a
duty on the part of Britain to recognize the problem and observe the
law of New Zealand. 83 Although only fifty-three nations have be-
173. See Articles Act, supra note 171, at § 5.
174. 2 W.L.R. at 10.
175. 3 All E.R. at 457.
176. Editorial, The Maori Artifact Case in the Court of Appeal, J. Bus. L. 265 (1982).
177. 3 All E.R. at 459.
178. Id. at 456. The concurring opinions cited different reasons for reaching the same
conclusion. The problem was not dealt with from the prospective of foreign public laws.
179. 2 All E.R. 93 (H.L. 1983).
180. Id. at 98-100.
181. Id.
182. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
183. Nafziger, supra note 109, at 812.
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come signatories, the UNESCO Convention brought the problem of
the illicit flow of cultural property to the forefront of world politics
and in addition became the emerging standard observed in the world
legal community.'
Canada is one of the few art-importing nations which have
signed and implemented the UNESCO Convention.185 Under the
Canadian legislation, which is modeled after the British example, 18
a restriction on exports is coupled with UNESCO inspired import
restrictions. At the request of any other signatory nation, the Attor-
ney General of Canada may file a suit in a Canadian court for the
return of an illicitly obtained object. The Act also contains a provi-
sion that any nation which makes such a claim and is successful
must compensate any innocent purchaser who might be damaged fi-
nancially by an unfavorable decision.
A recent criminal prosecution under this act, the Zango-Heller
case, received considerable attention in the American art commu-
nity. 87 The case involved a claim by Nigeria over an object that had
been brought into Canada without the proper Nigerian export certif-
icate. Nigeria requested that the work be returned after it was de-
tained by Canadian officials. As a result, criminal charges were filed.
The controversy in the Zango-Heller trial centered around the
fact that the object in question, although claimed by Nigeria as a
piece of cultural property, had been part of a private collection in
Paris from the 1950's until the late 1970's and had been purchased
by a New York dealer who attempted to sell the work to a Canadian
concern. Nigeria, as a signatory to the UNESCO Convention, made
a claim pursuant to the Canadian legislation and had the Canadian
government seize the work upon its arrival from the United States
and arrest its importers. The defendants, however, successfully
claimed that for the UNESCO implementing legislation to be uti-
lized by the prosecution, the work would have had to have left Nige-
ria after 1978, the effective date of Canada's legislation, and this
was not the case. The charges were dismissed at the trial level and
this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. A civil suit for
the rights to the sculpture was subsequently filed by the dealer and is
still pending. 188
184. Nafziger, Comments on the Relevance of Law and Culture to Cultural Property
Law, 10 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 323, at 328 (1983).
185. Canada became a full party to the UNESCO Convention on March 28, 1978.
186. Clark, supra note 157, at 786.
187. See Walker, Appeal Rejected in Zango-Heller Case, ARTNEWS, Jan. 1985, at 25;
A Hard Landing for Art Dealers, N.Y. Times, January 3, 1982, at E8, col. 1.
188. New York dealers Issaka Zango and Ben Heller were arrested in Calgary in De-
cember, 1981 with a Nigerian terracotta Zango had purchased in 1979. The sculpture was to
be sold to Mobil Oil of Canada, Ltd. for $650,000 (American). The charges under § 37 of the
Canadian Cultural Property Export and Import Act, for not having a valid Nigerian export
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The decision in the Zango-Heller case is in direct opposition to
Ortiz. While Ortiz brought out the difficulties that can result from a
lack of international cooperation concerning export and import laws,
the Zango-Heller case highlighted the problems that may arise when
there is over-zealous cooperation among countries that trade in art.
In Ortiz the British judiciary would not allow the government of
New Zealand to institute a suit based on a seemingly legitimate
claim under a New Zealand statute. In the Zango-Heller case the
Canadian government acted at the request of Nigeria to institute a
criminal prosecution against innocent purchasers of an object of eth-
nographic art. Clearly there exists a problem with each of these situ-
ations and a balance must be struck between the two approaches.
E. The Non-Governmental Approach
Traditionally, one of the biggest buyers of illicitly obtained an-
tiquities and other forms of cultural property has been the museum
community. Recently, however, a strong ethical stance has been
taken against this practice by professional organizations in the mu-
seum field. Throughout the 1970's writers called for responsibility in
the museum community and museum officials took notice. 89 Profes-
sional associations in the museum field devised codes of ethics for
museums and various museums individually did the same.1 90
In one of these policy statements the American Association of
Museums (AAM), which is the largest museum organization in the
United States, is to the point on the subject of illicitly obtained art
objects. The AAM's Museum Ethics states:
Illicit trade in objects encourages the destruction of sites,
the violation of national exportation laws, and the contravention
of the spirit of national patrimony. Museums must acknowledge
the relationships between the marketplace and the initial and
often destructive taking of an object for the commercial market.
They must not support that illicit market. Each museum must
develop a method for considering objects of this status for acqui-
sition that will allow it to acquire or accept an object only when
it can determine with reasonable certainty that it has not been
immediately derived from this illicit trade and that its acquisi-
tion does not contribute to the continuation of that trade.' 9 '
This is a direct and powerful statement. Similar statements have
certificate, were dismissed by the Court of Appeals with instructions that the defendants were
not to be retried. Zango has filed a subsequent civil suit seeking return of the object. The legal
theory in this civil suit parallels that of Zango's criminal defense. See also supra note 187.
189. Particularly, MEYER, supra note 30.
190. The first, and most famous of these codes was that of the University of Pennsylva-
nia, issued in 1970 (reprinted in MEYER, supra note 30, at Appendix).
191. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF MUSEUMS, MUSEUM ETHICS 12 (1978).
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been made by other professional associations in the academic and
professional museum field.1 92
Although such statements have been referred to as the "pop-
art" of international law,193 they should not be overlooked because
they are definitive statements which eliminate a large potential mar-
ket for illicitly obtained objects. These statements have a great deal
of influence in their respective disciplines. Any non-governmental or-
ganization's statement is much more powerful in the art world than
any export regulation or emerging custom of international law. Ad-
herence to these ethical standards is necessary for accreditation and
accreditation is usually a prerequisite for governmental funding. Mu-
seums thus have a stake in maintaining a strong ethical position.
V. Present Attempts by the United States to Control the Illicit
Traffic in Cultural Property
The Cultural Property Act, signed by the President in 1983,
was not the first piece of legislation restricting the illicit movement
of cultural property into the United States. In the wake of the Ma-
yan stelae crisis in the early 1970's,"" legislation was passed which
prevented the import of these objects. 195 Experts report that this leg-
islation was effective and that the crisis was alleviated as a result. 9
Success in this one instance does not mean that all such efforts
have fared as well. Other efforts at control, made through the courts
and administrative regulation in particular, have not been as success-
ful and have caused consternation among legal scholars and law en-
forcement officials, as well as art dealers, musuem officials and pri-
vate collectors. The major problem that frustrated and still frustrates
the attempts of the courts and the administrative agencies revolves
around the definition of the term "stolen." In light of foreign cul-
tural patrimony laws that claim all cultural property as a possession
of the state, "stolen" means more than the taking or retaining pos-
session of property that belongs to another.1 97
Compounding the ambiguity surrounding the word "stolen" is
the subtle difference between the "illegal" and "illicit" import of an
object into the United States. When an object is "illegally" imported
into the United States it has entered in violation of an established
law or regulation of the United States Customs Service. "Illicit" im-
192. See, e.g., supra note 190.
193. DuBoFF, supra note 30.
194. See supra note 78. See also generally MEYER, supra note 188.
195. 19 U.S.C. § 2091 (Supp. 11 1972).
196. Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act: Hearings on S.2261 and
H.R.5643 Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Trade of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. 62 (1978) (letter from Clemency Coggins of Harvard University).
197. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 739 (5th ed. 1979).
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port involves an object that has entered the United States without
any violation of an American import law, but possibly in violation of
another nation's export laws. Originally, when dealing with works of
art, the United States government was not concerned with violations
of the laws of other nations.198 All objects were permitted to enter
the country, illicitly or not.
This situation began to change in the early 1970's. The growing
problem of looting and destruction was coupled with a growing
awareness of that problem. The enforcement situation as it presently
exists in the United States resulted from this increased conscious-
ness. The following is an outline of the various aspects of United
States policy in the area of cultural property law and the problems
associated with each.
A. United States v. McClain - Using the National Stolen Prop-
erty Act Against Illicit Imports
If one case could be said to summarize and exemplify the confu-
sion over the situation surrounding the international movement of
cultural property, that case would be United States v. McClain.'99
This was actually more than one case, however, because it consisted
of a series of two trials and two appeals, both of which caused a
great deal of controversy in the art and legal communities. Each de-
cision involved the applicability of the National Stolen Property Act
(NSPA)20 ° to the illicit import of cultural property into the United
States. In this case the distinction between "illicit" versus "illegal"
imports and the varying definitions of "stolen" all came into play.
The facts of the McCain case involved a number of Central
American antiquities, most Mexican, that were brought into the
United States without the proper export certificates. The objects
were not stolen in the traditional sense, only illegally exported. Up
until that time this illegal export would not have been a violation of
American law, but Mexico had claimed all pre-Columbian antiqui-
ties as state property.20 1 Based on the Mexican claim to title the
United States government proceeded to prosecute under the sections
of the NSPA that make the interstate or international transfer of
goods known to be stolen and valued over $5000 illegal.""
198. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
199. 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977), reh'g denied 551 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1977) (per
curiam) [hereinafter cited as McClain 1]. There is also a second appeal, i.e., 593 F.2d 658
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 44 U.S. 918 (1979)) [hereinafter cited as McClain II].
200. 18 U.S.C. § 2314-15.
201. The original Mexican claim of ownership was based on the Ley Sobre Monumentos
Arqueolbgicas, Diario Oficial de Mayo de 1897 (1897) (cited in McClain I, supra note 199,
at 993).
202. See supra note 200.
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The defendants in McClain were convicted and appealed to the
Fifth Circuit.203 Nevertheless, the question as to when title to these
particular objects actually vested with the government of Mexico re-
mained. Legislation on the subject had existed since 1897, but the
Court of Appeals ruled that the vesting of title to the objects was not
unambiguous until May 6, 1972. Because there was no proof that
the objects left Mexico after that date the convictions were
reversed.20 4
However, even though the convictions were reversed, the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the legal theory on which the government pro-
ceeded. Illicit import of objects into the United States from a nation
that claimed title to cultural property through legislative fiat was
sufficient to consider those objects stolen.205 This decision changed
the importation policy on cultural property as it had existed up until
that point. Illicit import and illegal import were becoming increas-
ingly synonymous.
On remand the defendants were again convicted and again the
verdict was appealed. Subsequently, the convictions were affirmed in
part and reversed in part. This second appellate decision made no
substantial change in the position taken in its original McClain rul-
ing, a fact that angered many in the art and legal communities. Crit-
ics viewed the decision as offering a "blank check" to foreign govern-
ments in the area of cultural property. 6 Under the McClain
decision any nation could declare ownership through legislation and
have the United States government enforce the act.
The legal theory established by McClain was intended to meet
its first test in United States v. Bernstein, °7 a case involving $1.5
million worth of gold Peruvian antiquities which entered the United
States in violation of a Peruvian law similar to the earlier Mexican
claim of ownership over certain classifications of cultural property. 08
The great test of the McClain theory never came about, however,
because the government chose instead to prosecute on the basis of
the undervaluation of the goods brought into the country.209 The de-
fendant pled guilty and returned the objects to the Peruvian govern-
ment in exchange for a $1000 fine and 200 hours of community
service.""
203. McClain I, supra note 199, at 988.
204. Id. at 1004.
-205. Id. at 1003.
206. See BATOR, supra note 22; McAlee supra note 55, at 565.
207. No. 82-00019-A, (E.D. Va. Mar. 5, 1982).
208. See Schneider, A Lawyer Looks at U.S. Antiquities Law, 9 J. FIELD ARCHAEOL-
OGY 385 (1982); L.A. Daily J., Sept. 4, 1981, at 5, col. I.
209. 19 U.S.C. § 1592 (1980).
210. Daniels, Editorial, ANTIQUITY, March, 1983, at 3.
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B. Policy of the United States Customs Service - Still Evolving
The Customs Service is the enforcement agency most concerned
with international traffic in cultural property in the United States. In
1971 the then existing policy allowing for the free flow of artworks
into the United States began to erode.2"' With the enactment of the
Pre-Columbian Monuments Act of 1972212 the Customs Service was
given the power to substantively act to control the specific problems
concerning pre-Columbian antiquities. Previously, Customs could
only proceed against cultural property as it would proceed against
any other type of questionably imported goods.
Originally the only available weapons to control trafficking
problems involving art works were the general powers against the
lack of declaration,21 3 false declaration,21 ' and smuggling. 15 With
the McClain decision the Customs Service began to use the NSPA2 18
as a means of preventing illicitly obtained objects from entering the
country. More recently, Customs has become even more involved in
regulating the movement of cultural property under the Cultural
Property Act.
The boldest pronouncement on this subject is the Manual Sup-
plement on Seizure and Detention of Pre-Columbian Artifacts issued
by the Customs Service in 1982.217 This directive provided for the
detention and possible seizure of pre-Columbian works entering the
country without the proper export documentation. The Directive also
called for the utilization of the NSPA as set forth in McClain if the
importer acknowledged awareness of a foreign law claiming owner-
ship, or if other evidence of such knowledge existed.
Justification for the Directive is based on the Pre-Colubmian
Monuments Act and its accompanying regulations,1 ' the NSPA,2 19
general Customs proi isions against smuggled goods,220 and espe-
cially the agreements the United States has with Mexico and
Peru. 21 1 It is these latter two agreements, coupled with this Customs
Directive, that generate the most criticism against the Customs Ser-
vice. Critics consider the Directive a further extension of the "blank
211. Merryman, Trading in Art: Cultural Nationalism vs. Internationalism, 18 STAN.
LAWYER, Spring, 1984, at 24.
212. 19 U.S.C. § 2091 (Supp. II, 1972).
213. 19 U.S.C. § 1497 (1980).
214. See supra note 209.
215. 18 U.S.C. § 545 (1980).
216. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-2315 (1980).
217. Seizure and Detention of Pre-Columbian Artifacts, Policies & Procedures Manual
Supp. No. 3280-01, U.S. Customs Service (Oct. 5, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Customs
Directive].
218. 19 U.S.C. § 2091 (Supp. II, 1972); 19 C.F.R. §§ 12.105-12.109 (1984).
219. See supra note 216.
220. Title 19, Code of Federal Regulations (1984).
221. See supra notes 111-12.
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check" policy wrongfully legitimized in McClain.222
In justifying the Directive, a Customs official stated that it was
merely a recognition of a foreign country's claim of ownership.22 3
This official did not feel that Customs was offering "blank check"
enforcement of a foreign state's export laws but was only enforcing
ownership rights over a particular good, as it would with any other
item.2
Critics argue that the Directive fails to distinguish between real
and theoretical claims of theft and accepts a foreign country's policy
of ownership by legislation.2 5 Critics also say the Directive goes too
far and creates an embargo against all pre-Columbian objects
through its provision requiring that each object be detained pending
production of proper documentation. The biggest argument against
the Directive rests on the belief that Customs was never given the
authority to promulgate such a document since the Cultural Prop-
erty Act was to be the definitive statement by the United States on
the movement of cultural property.22
The Customs Directive is part of a network of enforcement in
the area of cultural property that has most recently included admin-
istrative regulations promulgated under the Cultural Property
Act. 227 These regulations are an attempt to codify the various
strands of United States enforcement policy since McClain to the
present. They are styled around earlier Customs regulations on pre-
Columbian monuments 228 and reflect the numerous concerns ex-
pressed during the long legislative debates that preceded the Act. 229
These regulations neither support nor reject any previous pronounce-
ment of Customs on the subject, however. Instead they relate to an
entirely different subject matter. The Customs Directive deals with
"stolen" property; the new regulations relate to the import and ex-
port provisions of the Cultural Property Act.230 Whether this is a
distinction without a difference remains to be seen.
222. See supra text accompanying note 203. See also, Fitzpatrick, The Lawless Cus-
toms Policy Toward Cultural Properties, 15 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 357 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Fitzpatrick]; McAlee, The McClain Case, Customs and Congress, N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 813 (1983) [hereinafter cited as McClain Case].
223. Walker, Theoretical Thefts, Real Claims, ARTNEWS, Mar. 1983, at 11 (quoting
Mr. Stuart Seidel of United States Customs Service).
224. Id.
225. See supra note 211.
226. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 222, at 857. The argument emphasizes the fact that the
Cultural Property Act was debated for ten years before it was finally enacted, therefore imply-
ing that everything that Congress wanted included in the Act was indeed included.
227. 50 Fed. Reg. 26193 (June 25, 1985) (amendments to 19 C.F.R. §§ 12, 178).
228. See supra note 218.
229. Telephone interview with John Doyle, United States Customs Service (Feb. 28,
1985).
230. Telephone interview with Ann Guthrie, Cultural Property Advisory Committee
(Feb. 28, 1985).
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C. Recent Legislative Attempts to Modify the Cultural Property
Act
Efforts to pass legislation to modify existing policy on cultural
property are still ongoing. In March of 1985 Senator Moynihan, rep-
resenting New York art dealers, introduced a bill in the Senate that
would amend the NSPA so that it would no longer apply in situa-
tions such as McClain.2"' If this bill were enacted, a foreign decree
of ownership through legislative fiat would no longer sustain a cause
of action under the NSPA. Similar bills were introduced in previous
sessions of Congress 32 and it is rumored that the art dealers,
through Senator Moynihan, agreed to support the Cultural Property
Act in exchange for passage of this bill.233 Opposition to any bill of
this kind has stemmed from those groups traditionally in favor of
regulation in the antiquities market. 34 The Administration has also
opposed the bill, calling such legislation contrary to the spirit of the
Cultural Property Act.235
Another bill that has been proposed to modify the Cultural
Property Act was introduced in the 98th Congress in both the House
and Senate. It was entitled the Cultural Repose Act and was to re-
fine § 312 of the Cultural Property Act. The purpose of this bill was
to provide for the protection of objects held in private collections and
museums in the United States by shortening and better defining the
elements that initiate the running of the statute of limitations. 3 " No
action was taken on either of these bills and there are currently no
plans for their reintroduction.23 7
VI. Assessment and Conclusion
United States policy in the area of cultural property law has
been the result of years of debate and thought. Various interests
have had to be considered and satisfied in the process. The result is
not just one unequivocal statement for or against an established and
succinct policy. It is a rubric of case law, legislation, and regulation
231. S.605, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) [hereinafter cited as S.605].
232. S.3102, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
233. See supra note 222, at 813.
234. Misc. Tariff Bills, 1982: Hearing on S.1723 Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Trade
of the Senate Finance Comm., 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 458 (1982) (letter from the American
Anthropological Association). See also supra text preceding and accompanying notes 32-33.
235. See supra note 230. By the Summer of 1985, the opposition to S.605, supra note
231, was convinced the bill would not pass. See Opposition to McClain Override Bill Mounts,
Aviso, July 1985, at 1; Proposed Bill Would Revise 'McClain' Ruling, THE ART NEWSLET-
TER, July 9, 1985, at 7-8.
236. 130 CONG. REc. S.8942 (daily ed. June 29, 1985). See also text accompanying
notes 141-46.
237. Telephone interview with Felix Sanchez of Senator Lloyd Bensten's staff (Feb. 14,
1985); Telephone interview with Terri Cornwell of the Congressional Acts Caucus (Feb. 14,
1985).
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created in an attempt to address an international problem, while
maintaining traditional policies in favor of free trade and the free
exchange of ideas through art.
The United States has an interest in cultural internationalism,
and even if its policy is not fully settled and unified, the ongoing
debate is healthy. It is healthy for those nations interested in protect-
ing their cultural patrimony and for those that would like to see an
unrestricted international flow of cultural property. Discussion and
debate have stimulated an interest and a genuine concern in an area
where there was little if any previous concern. The recent activity in
this area of the law can only be encouraged with the understanding
that policies concerning cultural property are developing, and will
continue to do so.
Lawrence J. Persick
